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Abstract
This paper examines a principal-agent problem between a manager (principal) and an 
employee (agent). At the contracting date uncertainty with regard to the profitability of the 
relationship is present. Once the contract is signed, the employee performs a specific 
investment that reduces his disutility from working hard. After that, but before the employee 
performs his effort, the uncertainty is resolved. The manager and the employee are free to 
renegotiate the contract at this point. Moreover, we distinguish three settings with respect to 
the principal’s and the agent’s options to terminate the relationship irrespective of possible 
renegotiation. If both parties are free to quit we find that an underinvestment problem with 
regard to the employee’s personal investment is present. If none of the parties are allowed to 
breach the contract, an overinvestment problem arises. Finally, allowing the employee to quit 
but not the manager allows achieving first best investment. 
21 Introduction 
In the wake of Enron and other spectacular company breakdowns at the beginning of the 
century, the issue of appropriate corporate governance mechanisms received great attention in 
policy as well as in academia. Many countries revised their company law and/or adopted 
corporate governance codices. The primary goal of these measures was to restore investors’ 
confidence in corporations and capital markets. Corporate governance in this context can be 
considered as a conglomerate of mechanisms to protect the interests of shareholders.
1
 As 
shareholders are primarily suppliers of capital, their natural interest is to get their money back 
with an appropriate return. An obvious threat to this interest, however, is immanent in the 
separation of ownership and control and the related, well recognized, principal-agent conflict 
between shareholders and managers. Corporate governance codices typically respond to this 
threat by proposing incentive contracting. Compensation of board members and members of 
the upper management should be tied to performance measures such as profit or share price in 
order to align incentives. 
In this paper we focus on an incentive problem that is likely to arise on a lower organizational 
level of the firm. It is, however, directly related to the type of incentive contracting 
recommended in corporate governance codices and can be considered as a “side-effect”.
Basically, we investigate an employee’s incentives to privately invest in capabilities 
specifically related to his job needs, given that his superior manager, triggered by an incentive 
contract, behaves in the best interest of shareholders.
Doing so, we try to accommodate the fact that human capital is of great importance for many 
firms.
2
 Specific knowledge and skills of the employees are often key for long term success. 
Part of these capabilities can certainly be acquired via firm specific trainings and are to be 
considered as investments of the firm rather than the employee. Other capabilities might be 
transferable to other jobs and in that sense are not job specific. However, it is very likely that 
some skills can be developed only via an employee’s personal effort and are directly 
applicable to his specific job.
3
 For instance one may assume that the employee could 
systematically process previous experience from working and thus raise efficiency whenever 
an issue repeats itself rather than to simply perform a predetermined procedure once and once 
again without any reflection. 
We try to capture such a setting using the most parsimonious model that satisfies our needs. 
1  See e.g. Shleifer/Vishny  (1997). 
2 See e.g. Becker (1993), Hanson (2004). 
3 See Pischke (2001) or Loewenstein/Spletzer (1999). 
3We assume that a manager employs a subordinated employee. This employee performs a 
contractible task. The task as well as the employee’s compensation contributes to a 
performance measure that enters the manager’s incentive contract. From the employee’s 
perspective, performing the task is hard work and causes a disutility. However, the employee 
is able to reduce this disutility via a private investment of the nature described above. The 
employment considered is a long term relationship in the sense that additional information 
arises after the contract is signed, but before the particular task considered is carried out. In 
such a setting commitment is hard to achieve and we rather assume that renegotiation of the 
contract is feasible, if both parties to the contract agree to do so. 
Our setup shows great similarities to previous contributions to the literature on hold-up.
4
However, it also shows some relevant differences. The hold-up literature typically considers a 
buyer - seller relationship with bilateral investments. Bargaining power is generally not fixed 
and various alternatives are considered. As opposed to that we consider a standard principal-
agent relationship between a manager and an employee. Given this notion we allocate all 
bargaining power to the manager. Thus we assume that the manager offers a contract to the 
employee at the beginning of the game as well as (possibly) at the renegotiation stage, both on 
a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Specific investment opportunities are assumed to exist only on the 
employee’s side, rather than for both parties. 
We find that, whether the classical underinvestment problem related to hold-up arises, 
depends critically upon the assumptions we make with regard to the options both parties, the 
employee and the manager, have, to terminate the employment. In particular, if and only if, 
both parties are free to terminate the relationship, underinvestment arises. An overinvestment 
problem is present if none of the parties is entitled to quit, and, finally, first best investment 
incentives can be induced if only the employee is free to terminate the relationship.
Among the numerous contributions to the literature that investigate hold-up, our paper is most 
intertwined with Hart/Moore (1988), Chung (1991), and Nöldeke/Schmidt (1995), and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, with Edlin/Reichelstein (1995) .
Hart/Moore (1988) in their seminal paper formalize the hold-up problem using a setting in 
which the trading quantity is binary and trade is voluntary. The original contract might be 
subject to renegotiation after all uncertainty is resolved. Building on Hart/Moore (1988), 
Chung (1991) and Nöldeke/Schmidt (1995) offer solutions to the hold-up problem. Chung 
4 See e.g. Shavell (1980), Hart/Moore (1988),  Aghion et.al. (1990,1994),  Nöldeke/Schmidt (1995), Hart (2009) 
to name some. 
4(1991) derives first best assuming that breach of contract is impossible while allowing for 
renegotiation. Assuming that the trading quantity is continuous, he shows that first best can be 
achieved. Nöldeke/Schmidt (1995) show that an option contract, that allows the seller to insist 
on trade, is sufficient to achieve first best, no matter whether the trading quantity is binary or 
variable. Finally Edlin/Reichelstein (1995) consider two types of breach remedies and 
investigate to what extend “specific performance” and “expectation damages” are suitable to 
solve the underinvestment problem, assuming once more continuous trading quantities. 
As mentioned above, we investigate three settings that differ with regard to the employee’s 
and the manager’s options to terminate their relationship. Throughout the paper we assume 
that the employee’s effort is binary. In our first setting both parties are free to terminate their 
relationship before the employee performs his effort. This setting is closely related to the one 
in Hart/Moore (1988).
In our second setting no termination is possible, such as in Chung (1991). This setup also 
quite replicates the breach remedies considered by Edlin/Reichelstein (1995), at least given 
the specific assumptions about contract enforcement made in their paper. However, assuming 
in contrast to both papers, that effort is binary, prevents first best in our paper  and we identify 
an overinvestment problem. 
In the third setting we allow that the employee quits, but not the manager. This setting 
parallels the model of  Nöldeke/Schmidt (1995).  
Moreover, a paper by Gelter (2009) makes a point that is closely related to ours. He identifies 
a hold-up problem with regard to specific investments in human capital, if managers act in the 
best interest of shareholders, as we do. Based on that, he argues that the hold-up problem is 
especially severe if shareholders are powerful. He reasons that a system characterized by large 
blockholders (such as in Central Europe) aggravates the hold-up problem while one 
characterized by dispersed ownership (as in the US) reduces it. In contrast we assume that 
incentive contracts are relevant and affect managers’ behaviour without any need for direct 
interference by a blockholder whatsoever. Such contracts, however, appear to be even more 
common in the US as compared to Europe.    
The next section describes our model. In section 3, 4 and 5 we derive solutions to the 
principal-agent problem, assuming alternative settings with regard to termination of the 
relationship as described above. Section 6 concludes. 
2 The Model 
We consider a principal-agent relationship between a manager and a subordinated employee. 
The manager aims at maximizing some output ),( ax  net of compensation cost that 
contributes to the performance measure used to evaluate and to compensate the manager. 
),( ax  is increasing in the employee’s effort  with a }1,0{a . As  is binary we basically 
distinguish two cases. Either the employee works hard for the firm, indicated by , or he 
does not work at all ( ). Both cases are assumed to be observable and contractible. 
a
1a
0a   is a 
random variable that materializes throughout the game and takes on values from the set 
, with density  )(f .   as well as ),( ax  are assumed to be observable to the manager 
and the employee but not to a third party. Thus neither   nor ),( ax  can be used for 
contracting. If the agent does not work for the firm 0),0( x  with certainty. 
If the employee works hard this causes a disutility ),,( Iad  thus that 0),,1( Id  and 
0),,0( Id . The agent’s disutility depends on   as well as on an investment in his personal 
capabilities I .  improves specific knowledge needed for the job. It decreases disutility 
from working hard, 
0I
0),,1( 	Id I , at a decreasing rate, 0),,1( IdII  . The investment has, 
however, no outside value in the sense that it is useless for possible future employments. 
Again we assume that I  is not contractible directly and thus needs to be motivated via an 
appropriate contract. Both parties are risk neutral. The game proceeds as follows. 
Contract is 
signed
Personal
investment  I
  is realized a  is chosen Payment to 
agent
Possible
renegotiation
Figure 1: Timeline.  
At the beginning of the game the manager offers a contract to the employee that specifies 
payments to be made to the employee depending on his effort level . Having signed the 
contract, the employee chooses an investment level 
a
I . After both parties learned   the effort 
 has to be decided upon. We will make different assumptions regarding the employee’s 
options to quit or to perform as well as the manager’s options for layoff/employment in the 
upcoming sections. 
a
5
Regardless of these assumptions we assume that renegotiation of the following form is 
possible: The manager offers the employee a revised contract that again specifies  and 
related payments on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. If the employee accepts the revised terms, the 
new contract becomes binding, alternatively the old contract remains in place. Finally the 
employee is paid based on the actual contract. 
a
2.1 Benchmark
To provide a benchmark for further analysis, we assume in this section that I  as well as  is 
contractible and can be chosen by the manager. Solving the manager’s optimization problem 
by backwards induction we start determining the optimal choice of .
a
a
Once I  has been chosen and all uncertainty has been resolved the manager chooses  such 
that
a
)},,(),({maxarg),(
}1,0{
*  IadaxIa
a



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Having assumed that 0),0( x  and 0),,0( Id  we obtain 
.
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
else  0
0),,1(),1( if   1
*
 Idx
a
Given  the manager chooses *a I  to maximize expected total surplus 
IdfIdxIdfIadaxEU MFB 



 

 )()],,1(),1([)()],*,()*,([
'
 (1) 
where      ,,1,1|' Idx  .
We assume that a unique interior *I  exists. Note that the solution to the manager’s 
optimization problem coincides with a setting in which the manager performs   and ),( ** Ia a
I  himself (at identical costs) rather than to employ an agent. It also equals the socially 
optimal welfare maximizing solution. 
3 Both parties are entitled to terminate the relationship 
We assume in this section that the employee is free to resign from the job, that is to choose 
, after 0a   is learned. Likewise we assume that the manager is free to lay off the 
employee which also implies . Related to that we presume that two payments are 0a
6
contracted upon in the initial contract: If 1a  the employee receives  and  is paid if 
.  can be interpreted as severance payment received after termination of the 
relationship. For simplicity we assume that this payment is the same no matter whether the 
employee quits or is laid off.  
1G 0G
0a 0G
As in the benchmark setting we use backwards induction starting at the point in time where all 
uncertainty is resolved, that is I  and   are known.  At that stage the employee will generally 
decide to fulfil the contract whenever his benefit from working, ),,1(1 IdG 
 , is above the 
severance pay  and he quits otherwise.  Conversely, the manager sticks to the contract, if 
his benefits from doing so exceeds the costs involved with quitting, 
0G
01),1( GGx 

 .
Renegotiation, however, adds an additional option to both parties. The manager is free to 
offer a new contract and the employee can either accept or deny. We assume that the 
employee accepts whenever he is at least indifferent between the new contract and the payoff 
without renegotiation. These considerations lead us to distinguish basically four cases:
(1) 01),1( GGx 

  and 01 ),,1( GIdG 
 
The relationship benefits both parties. Renegotiation is not feasible as there exists no contract 
that benefits the manager without hurting the employee. 
(2)   01),1( GGx 
	
  and 01 ),,1( GIdG 
 
Given the initial contract the relationship benefits the employee while the manager prefers to 
quit, that is to lay off the employee. Two sub-settings need to be distinguished.
(a) If 0),,1(),1( 
  Idx , the manager benefits from offering a new contract that pays 
the employee ),,1(01 IdGG   if 1a . The employee receives the severance 
payment and is compensated for his disutility related to hard work. Thus he is left 
indifferent to being laid off, which is sufficient for him to agree to the renegotiation 
offer.
(b) If 0),,1(),1( 	
  Idx  it does not pay off for the manager to induce  via 
renegotiation and he decides to lay off the employee and to pay . 
1a
0G
(3) 01),1( GGx 

  and 01 ),,1( GIdG 	
 
The initial contract benefits the manager but is unattractive for the employee. The latter would 
decide to quit without renegotiation. Again two sub-settings need to be distinguished. 
7
(a) If 0),,1(),1( 
  Idx  it once more pays off for the manager to offer a new contract 
that pays ),,1(01 IdGG   and leaves the employee indifferent between fulfilling 
the new contract and terminating the relationship.  
(b) If 0),,(),1( 	
  Iadx , as above, the manager prefers not to interfere and lets the 
employee quit paying .0G
(4) 01),1( GGx 
	
  and 01 ),,1( GIdG 	
 
In this case neither the manager nor the employee benefit from sticking to the relationship. 
Moreover, the above inequalities imply 0),,(),1( 	
  Iadx . Thus the manager cannot 
benefit from renegotiation and the relationship is terminated by paying  to the employee.  0G
The analysis above demonstrates that 1a  is part of the final contract if and only if  
0),,1(),1( 
  Idx . Thus the benchmark solution is replicated in the renegotiation game. 
Given that  is contractible and chosen after all uncertainties have been resolved, however,  
this result comes as no surprise.  
a
Moreover, we are ready to derive lemma 1. 
Lemma 1: The ex ante expected utilities of the manager and the employee are given as 
follows: 


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Proof:5
Summarizing the analysis of the renegotiation game from above we obtain the following net 
payoffs for the manager and the employee, respectively: 
8
5 See Nöldeke/Schmidt (1995), p. 169 for a similar approach. 
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Integrating over   yields (2) and (3).       

Given Lemma 1 the ex ante optimization problem of the manager can be characterized as 
follows: 

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  (IC) 
The manager maximizes his expected net payoff subject to an individual rationality constraint 
(IR) and an incentive compatibility constraint (IC) of the employee. (IR) ensures that the 
employee is willing to sign the initial contract. We normalize his reservation pay to zero 
without loss of generality. The second constraint, (IC) states that the employee chooses I  as 
to maximize his personal payoff.  
Note that the first best solution to the manager’s ex ante optimization problem, is indeed 
equivalent to the benchmark solution above, as is briefly demonstrated below. 
At the optimum the (IR) is binding. Solving the (IR) for  and inserting into the manager’s 
objective function leads 
0G





'
)()],,1(),1([max  dfIdxIEU MFB
I
,
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which is identical to (1) from section 2.1. 
In contrast, in the second best setting I  is chosen according to (IC). Comparing both 
expressions leads to proposition 1.
Proposition 1: 
If ''  '  there does not exist a contract that implements first best. Rather, the employee 
chooses MFBE II 	 .
Proof:
Recalling the definition of '  the first best problem can be rewritten to obtain 
   dfxdfIdIEU MFB ),1()(),,1(
''




 .
In contrast EI  is chosen as to maximize 






''
010    )()],,1()[(  dfIdGGIGEU
E
 dfGGGdfIdI 





''
010
''
)()(   )(),,1( .
Taking the F.O.C. with respect to I  we obtain
0)(),,1(1
'


 

 dfId
dI
dEU
I
MFB
 and 
0)(),,1(1
''


 

 dfId
dI
dEU
I
E
.
Note that for  ''  ' I
dI
dEU
dI
dEU EMFB
    and thus EMFB II  .

Intuitively the investment pays off for the employee, if and only if his net payoff depends on  
),,1( Id  after renegotiation. This happens only in case (1) as identified above. The 
probability that case (1) occurs, however is strictly lower than the one that 
0),,1(),1( 
  Idx , which drives the investment choice in the first best setting. 
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Accordingly, the employee’s choice of I   is below first best and an underinvestment 
problem, similar to the one identified in Hart/Moore (1988) arises. 
4 None of the parties is entitled to terminate the relationship 
In this section we assume that none of the parties can unilaterally decide to quit the 
relationship agreed upon in the initial contract. In fact we implicitly assume that if one party 
refuses to abide by the contract, a court would step in automatically and enforce the contract. 
6
 Accordingly, the original contract in this section fixes a payment  to be paid if  but 
no payment  to be paid in case of termination. At the renegotiation stage, however, the 
parties are still free to agree on  if  this turns out to be attractive. 
1G 1a
0G
0a
Starting with the renegotiation game again we identify four relevant cases that parallel the 
ones from the previous section.  
(1) 0),1( 1 
Gx   and 0),,1(1 
 IdG
Renegotiation does not take place based on the same arguments put forward in section 3. 
(2)   0),1( 1 	
Gx   and 0),,1(1 
 IdG
 (a) Assume 0),,1(),1( 
  Idx . As the manager cannot terminate the relationship 
 the threat-point present in the first setting is missing here and the best the manager can 
 do is to stick to the original contract.  
 (b) Assume 0),,1(),1( 	
  Idx . Now the manager prefers to renegotiate the contract 
 to implement 0a . To see this, note that offering ),,1(10 IdGG 
  ensures that 
 the employee is indifferent between contracts and will accept the renegotiation offer. 
 From the manager’s perspective, however, 11 ),1(),,1( GxIdG 

   given that 
0),,1(),1( 	
  Idx , which renders the renegotiated contract beneficial.
(3) 0),1( 1 
Gx   and 0),,1(1 	
 IdG
 (a) Assume that 0),,1(),1( 
  Idx . As the employee cannot terminate the 
 unfavourable relationship, the initial contract remains in place and benefits the 
 manager. 
                                                
11
6 Note that this setting differs slightly from one in which one party needs to sue to ensure that the contract is 
enforced given that the other one breaches the contract. 
 (b) Assume 0),,(),1( 	
  Iadx . In this case the manager can improve his already 
 favourable situation further by offering a new contract that implements  and 
 pays 
0a
),,1(10 IdGG 
  in the renegotiation setting similar to (2b).   
(4) 0),1( 1 	
Gx   and 0),,1(1 	
 IdG
Neither the manager nor the employee benefits from the original contract which implies 
0),,1(),1( 	
  Idx . The best the manager can do to minimize losses is to offer a contract 
specifying  and to pay 0a ),,1(10 IdGG 
  to the employee.  
Similar to the previous section, the analysis of the renegotiation game allows us to derive the 
ex ante expected payoffs for both players. 
Lemma 2: The expected utilities of the manager and the employee are given as follows: 



  dfIdxGEU M )()},,1();,1(max{1      (4) 
and




     )()],,1(1  dfIdIGEU
E       (5) 
Proof:
Summarizing the analysis of the renegotiation game from above we obtain the following net 
payoffs for the manager and the employee, respectively: 








apply (4)or  , (3b) (2b), if                          ),,1(
apply     (3a) (2a), (1), if                             ),1(
1
1


IdG
xG
U M
),,1(1 IdGU
E 

Cases (1), (2a), and (3a) are characterized by 0),,1(),1( 
  Idx , while the opposite is true 
for (2b), (3b), and  (4). Thus whenever ),,1(),1(  Idx  the manager “receives“ ),1( x ,
),,1( Id  otherwise. 
Integrating over   yields (4) and (5). 

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Given lemma 2 the ex ante optimization problem of the manager can be characterized as 
follows: 



  dfIdxGEU M
G
)()},,1();,1(max{max 1
1
s.t.




    0 )(),,1(1  dfIdIGEU
E   (IR) 




    )(),',1('maxarg 1
'
 dfIdIGI
I
  (IC) 
The first best solution to the above optimization problem is obtained again ignoring the (IC).  
The procedure equals the one shown in section 3 and is omitted here. 
Comparing (1) to the (IC) from above allows to derive proposition 2. 
Proposition 2: 
If '  , there does not exist a contract that implements first best. Rather, the employee 
chooses MFBE II  .
Proof:
The employee chooses I  as to maximize  




     )(),,1(1  dfIdIGEU
E
while the manager maximizes  
   dfxdfIdIEU MFB ),1()(),,1(
''





in the first best setting. 
Taking the F.O.C. we obtain 
0)(),,1(1 

 

 dfId
dI
dEU
I
E
  and 
0)(),,1(1
'


 

 dfId
dI
dEU
I
MFB
.
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If '   it follows that  I   
dI
dEU
dI
dEU MFBE
 and thus MFBE II  .

Without an option for layoff, the employee’s threat-point at the renegotiation stage is the 
employed status quo. Thus the manager needs to ensure (at least) indifference between this 
status quo and the new contract. It follows that the employee’s net payoff after renegotiation 
equals the payoff from the original contract for all realizations of  . The employee thus 
always benefits from investment, while in the benchmark setting investment only pays off if 
0),,1(),1( 
  Idx . This drives the overinvestment problem identified in proposition 2.  
5 Only the employee is entitled to quit 
Having identified an underinvestment problem in the setting with two sided options to quit 
and an overinvestment problem when none of the parties can quit, we continue to investigate 
an intermediate case. Due to presumed greater practical relevance we analyze the setting in 
which the employee can terminate the relationship while the manager has no such option, 
rather than vice versa. 
Thus from now on we assume that the employee can either quit or insist on fulfilling his 
contract before a renegotiation offer is made by the manager. If he decides to quit, he receives 
a severance payment . Again, this affects the threat-point relevant for renegotiation. 0G
Analyzing the cases identified already in the renegotiation game in section 3 leads to the 
following outcomes. 
 (1) 01),1( GGx 

  and 01 ),,1( GIdG 
 
No changes occur as compared to the first setting. No renegotiation takes place.  
(2)   01),1( GGx 
	
  and 01 ),,1( GIdG 
 
(a) Assume 0),,1(),1( 
  Idx . The contract benefits the employee, who will insist on 
working for the firm. As the manager cannot lay off the employee, the best he can do is to 
stick to the initial contract.   
(b) Assume 0),,1(),1( 	
  Idx . Here the manager benefits from preventing the employee 
from working hard. He does so by offering a new contract ),,1(10 IdGG 
  that is 
accepted by the employee.  
(3) 01),1( GGx 

  and 01 ),,1( GIdG 	
 
14
 (a)  Assume 0),,1(),1( 
  Idx . The employee would decide to quit given he receives no 
renegotiation offer from the manager. As the relationship is generally efficient, it benefits the 
manager to offer a contract ),,1(01 IdGG   to ensure that the employee agrees to perform 
.1a
(b) Assume 0),,(),1( 	
  Iadx . Given such inefficient relationship, as in section 3 the 
manager prefers not to interfere and lets the employee quit paying him .0G
(4) 01),1( GGx 
	
  and 01 ),,1( GIdG 	
 
In this case neither the manager nor the employee benefit from sticking to the relationship. 
Here, with the employee’s option to quit, the manager accepts the employee’s decision and 
pays .0G
The above considerations lead to lemma 3. 
Lemma 3: The expected utilities of the manager and the employee are given as follows: 
 
 
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
' '''
010 )()],,1()[()()],,1(),1([  dfIdGGdfIdxGEU
M  (6) 
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
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

'''
010 )()],,1()[(  dfIdGGIGEU
E      (7) 
with )},,1({''' 01  IdGG 
 .
Proof:
Summarizing the analysis of the renegotiation game from above we obtain the following net 
payoffs for the manager and the employee, respectively: 
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
apply (4)or  (3b) if                                          
applies (3a) if            ),,1(),1(
  applies (2b) if      ),,1()(
apply  (2a)or  (1) if         )(),1(
0
0
010
010
G
IdxG
IdGGG
GGxG
U M





 



apply (4)or  (3) if                                            
apply     (2)or  (1) if         ),,1()(
0
010
G
IdGGG
U E

Integrating over   yields (6) and (7). 
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Given lemma 3 the ex ante optimization problem of the manager can be characterized as 
follows: 
 
 






' '''
010
,
)()],,1()[()()],,1(),1([max
10
 dfIdGGdfIdxGEU M
GG
s.t.
0)()],,1()[(
'''
010 


 

 dfIdGGIGEU E   (IR) 






'''
010
'
)()],',1()[('maxarg  dfIdGGIGI
I
  (IC) 
Again first best as derived in 2.1 is obtained ignoring the (IC). Comparing the manager’s first 
best to the employee’s (IC) leads to proposition 3, given that the set of assumptions below 
holds.
Assumption 1:  Define  with 01 GGG 
 ],[ GGG 
(i) There exists a G  such that 0}0);,,1([max{ 
 IdG for sure and a G  such 
that ),,1(}0);,,1(max{[  IdGIdG 

  for sure. 
(ii)  is a continuous function in  )( GI  G  with a unique maximum  . )(* GI 
Proposition 3: Choosing and  appropriately implements the first best.  )( 01 GGG 
 0G
Proof:
Note that the ex ante probability that 1* a  is below one. Thus in the benchmark setting I  is 
chosen based on the fact that investment does not pay off in some states of nature   and does 
so in others. Choosing GG   ensures that investment never pays off for the employee. He 
chooses  and thus under-invests. 0I GG  , in contrast, ensures that investment always 
pays off for the employee and provides him with incentives to over-invest. From assumption 
1 (ii) and the intermediate value theorem it follows that there exists a ],[ GGG   such 
that . Holding  fixed  can be chosen appropriately to satisfy (IR). **)( IGI  G 0G
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Recall that in our first setting in section 3 the two-sided option to quit gave rise to an 
underinvestment problem. In contrast no option to quit in section 4 produced overinvestment. 
In both settings first best was prevented by the fact, that the ex ante probability of the 
investment to pay off for the employee differed from the ex ante probability for the whole 
relationship to be efficient, which is relevant for the benchmark level *I . In section 3 this 
probability was too low; it was too high in section 4.  In the actual setting, however, the one 
sided option to quit effectively provides the manager with an additional degree of freedom 
that can be used in contracting. In fact 01 GGG 
  can be freely chosen by the manager in 
order to match the probability that the investment pays off for the employee in the second best 
setting with the probability that it pays off in the benchmark setting. Moreover,  can be 
chosen to ensure that the (IR) is binding. This is basically the result from Nöldeke/Schmidt 
(1995).
0G
6 Conclusions
In this paper we consider a relationship between an employee and a manager with specific 
investment on the side of the employee. We find that an incentive contract designed to align 
the manager’s incentives to those of shareholders at the same time may create an incentive 
problem with regard to investment incentives of the employee. Given that human capital and 
ongoing investment therein appears to be of raising importance for many firms, this “side-
effect” of what is perceived as good corporate governance might turn out to be problematic.  
However, with appropriate regulations concerning job termination, incentive contracts are 
shown to be innocuous.
 Our analysis is closely intertwined with several contributions to the hold-up literature. In 
contrast to that literature, however, our focus is not so much on designing a mechanism that 
produces first best. Rather we compare different termination rules in order to understand their 
effect on investment incentives. To do so we contrast different approaches found in the 
literature and adapt them in order to be able to interpret them in the context of a principal-
agent relationship and employment contracting.   
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